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Available online 23 June 2016AbstractToday Islamic finance industry is under severe criticism, particularly, concerning liquidity management practices of treasury departments.
Since cash lending is not possible under Islamic Shari'ah, Islamic banks tend to use securitized asset related schemes which are by no means
neither acceptable under Islamic finance jurisprudence nor compliant with Maqasiq Al-Shari'ah. Maqasid Al-Shariah oversees economic ac-
tivities which produce wealth and prosperity for all members of society to empower any member with certain level of belongings to bestow
freedom while condemning inequality. Under this wider aim of Maqasid Al-Shari'ah, this paper presents alternative state-of-art Shari'ah
compliant products, which is used in international trade finance, to be migrated to electronic trading platform under organized exchange in
pursuit of replacing controversial liquidity management products. Besides, this paper introduces Islamic Commodity Future Contract, derived
from asset backed Murabaha, with physical delivery as an alternative liquidity management tool for Islamic FIs and hedging tool for companies.
Copyright © 2016, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim S¸irketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Islamic finance industry has substantially grown since its
early infant phase in 1970s. Demographic boost and increased
oil prices supported growth of Islamic finance industry
alongside the economic growth of OIC countries. With
increased complexity and products of conventional finance,
Islamic banks, may be unnecessarily, felt to provide Islamic
alternative of any product offered by conventional peers.
Coupled with difficulty in liquidity management for treasury
function, this put Islamic finance under some criticism. Is-
lamic scholars evaluated several cases for treasury functionE-mail address: ahmetsuayb@hotmail.com.
Peer review under responsibility of Borsa _Istanbul Anonim S¸irketi.
1 Al-Maqasid Al-Shari'ah; as per Chapra Human Development and Well-
Being to be realized by ensuring the enrichment of: Nafs (Human self), Mal
(Wealth), Nasl (Posterity), Aql (Intellect) and Din (Faith).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2016.06.002
2214-8450/Copyright © 2016, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim S¸irketi. Production and hos
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).and some of them from Maqasid Al'Ahariah point of view
issued temporary Fatwa until Shari'ah compliant alternative
found.1 The most prominent case is Tawarruq, as Islamic FIs
would have negative carry and fail in the long-term, some
Islamic Scholar allowed Tawarruq for temporary base. How-
ever, not much solid work done to provide Shari'ah compliant
alternative solutions. Once accept for short-term solution
stayed as fine financial product. Today Islamic banks can be
deemed in the course of conventional banks as they have some
practices, which would literally convert Islamic banks to
conventional.
Regardless of the criticism, traditional Islamic finance
contracts: Murabaha, Mudaraba, Musharaka, Ijara, Istisna
presents strong potential to serve Maqasid Al-Shari'ah with
stronger credit management features as embedded in lending
process itself. However, in some instances criticism on Islamic
banks can not be very much substantiated. For example, Is-
lamic banks are criticized on extensive reliance on Murabahating by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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Islamic Finance. Islamic finance is reflection of real economy.
If in an economy 90 percent of transaction relates to trade
finance, then naturally 90 percent of contract used for trade
finance shall be based on Murabaha while remaining shall be
subject of project finance or Sukuk, hence, Istisna and Ijara.
Besides, while putting Islamic FIs under the spot light one
should also take decision making process of loan seekers who
prefer Murabaha sale if the deal is profitable and less risky
while criticizing Islamic FIs not engage in profit-loss-sharing,
in case of less profitable and high risk deals. Most of the
controversial discussion in Islamic finance today has more
intricate than it appears.
In order to address the problem with strong underpinning,
in the next section, controversial novelty in Islamic finance is
to be introduced. Any new Islamic finance product should
avoid these to have strong Shari'ah foundations.
2. Usual suspects
The evaluation of any Islamic finance product should start
with:
1 Checking Compliance with Maqasid Al-Shari'ah.
2 Ensuring facilitation/financing real economic transaction.
Hence, one should start with benefit of the product for
social welfare. In many instances, a product may comply with
Islamic finance principle, yet, undermine Maqasid Al-Sha-
ri'ah: financing arms throughMurabaha sale, piling household
debt with seductive consumption loans and creating cash loan
balloons not connected to real economy. Keeping this in mind,
today most controversial contemporary Islamic finance prod-
ucts, such as Sukuk, treasury liquidity management products
and hedging tools, developed based on three types of novelty:2.1. Bai Al-InahRosly and Sanusi (1999) identifies Bai Al-Inah as exten-
sively used contract type employed for designing of, particu-
larly, Sukuk. In its most basic form, it is a two party differed
sale transaction. Loan seekers sells to the fund owner some
object, gets cash and buys simultaneously back the same ob-
ject, as-is without any change, for a greater amount to be paid
in a future date. Majority of Islamic scholar finds Bai Al-Inah
unacceptable since it is a circumvention for cash loan, hence,
Riba.2 The stance of Islamic scholar would not change even if
buy back is not simultaneous end after an Ijara, from creditor
to debtor, to finish automatically with transfer of ownership
back to loan seeker/debtor. The gist is to focus on a real sale:
two sales in chain among third party supplier of the product,
loan seeker/debtor and financier/creditor. The third party
supplier is missing in any cases, hence, causes a red flag. The2 For more details on the issue, one may refer to work of Rosly and Sanusi
(1999).evolved versions of basic Bai Al-Inah is akin to “Sale and
Lease-back” structures, which is very often preferred by
companies for taxation purposes, offered by conventional
leasing companies.2.2. Islamic discounting/factoring (Bai Al-Dayn)“Those who consume interest cannot stand [on the Day of
Resurrection] except as one stands who is being beaten by
Satan into insanity. That is because they say, “Trade is
[just] like interest.” But Allah has permitted trade and has
forbidden interest. So whoever has received an admonition
from his Lord and desists may have what is past, and his
affair rests with Allah. But whoever returns to [dealing in
interest or usury] e those are the companions of the Fire;
they will abide eternally therein” (2:275)
Very often bill discounting or factoring is proposed as similar
toMurabaha and hence Shari'ah compliant alternatives in trade
finance. There are certain features ofMurabahawhich makes it
a good omen for trade finance and protect economy from sys-
tematic risk created by conventional finance methods:
1 In case of Murabaha, fund disbursement is done to the
account of supplier. This feature gives better credit risk
assessment opportunity for banks and impede debtor to
use funds for unproductive and/or speculative causes
instead of real business.
2 At the date of disbursement, repayment date and sale price
is determined. In case of delay in repayments, financier
cannot accrue late payment charges to her account.
Accordingly, financier should better evaluate credit
worthiness of debtor and direct loans to credit worthy ones.
3 Since Murabaha finances/facilitate bono-fide transaction,
it would less likely to give rise to credit bubble.
Islamic finance gets most closes to factoring or discounting
in Export financing, yet, even in this case there is a serious
difference: recourse to loan seekers. In Islamic export finance
based on Murabaha, financier can not recourse to loan seeker
(exporter) and needs to wait to be repaid back from importer,
takes the risk of final buyer. In case of discounting/factoring
financier can recourse to loan seeker (exporter).3 With all these
feature, unlike debt trading, Islamic finance would by no
means loss its connection with real economy, hence, should
not led to credit bubble.2.3. Commodity Murabaha based on organized
TawarruqToday most of Islamic banks' Murabaha syndications,
inter-bank lending and hedging tools such as Islamic SWAPS
are based on organized Tawarruq. Tawarruq became panacea
for treasury department of Islamic FIs. The issue is widely3 Please refer to Gundogdu (2016) for more details.
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Mobilizing Bank) and potential lender (Liquidity Managing
Bank), exchange precious metal contracts with cash through
commodity trader. Liquidity Managing bank buys metal con-
tract and make a differed sell to Resource Mobilizing bank,
which then sell the metal contract to another commodity
trader, receive cash. Resource Mobilizing Bank on maturity
repay back differed sale price to Liquidity Managing Bank.
At initial stages, there were only one commodity trader and
after severe Shari'ah critic second commodity trader intro-
duced. However, even then the structure is organized Tawar-
ruq which was disallowed by Islamic Fiqh academia: this is
not a regular Tawarruq but organized Tawarruq with the
purpose of circumventing for cash lending. Some other banks
introduced common stock instead of precious metal contracts
and other forms which are more convincing yet looking from
Maqasid Al-Shariah itself reveals the flaw. The parties
involved in this transaction does not facilitate/finance bono-
fide economic activity but create debt out of a thin air.
An example of commodity Murabaha based on Tawarruq
illustrated in Fig. 1. There is no connection between precious
metal contract and physical metal stock. Gundogdu (2014a)Fig. 1. Commodity Murabaha based on organized Tawarruq. Source:
Gundogdu (2014a, 2014b).
Fig. 2. 2-Step Murabaha under stock exchanextensively dwell on the problem and proposed an alterative
Shari'ah compliant 2-Step Murabaha structure, which is used
in international trade finance, for interbank lending.
3. From greenfield to capital markets
Concerning Islamic finance industry, the bulk of the inter-
bank lending drives from trade finance while remaining from
investment finance. The excess and shortage of funds comes
from economic activity level difference among banks/coun-
tries. Keeping speculative business lines of conventional bank
aside, Islamic banks day-to-day needs to borrow-lend money
to carry out their facilitator role as financier. Very often, Is-
lamic FIs resort to commodity Murabaha which is not Sha-
ri'ah compliant based on Islamic Fiqh academy and due to
cash lending has distortion effect similar to conventional
practice. Gundogdu (2014a) proposed 2-Step Murabaha
structure to fulfill, trade finance borrowing-lending needs of
Islamic Banks. As indicated in Fig. 2, resource mobilizing
bank (RMB) can issue a 2-Step Murabaha agreement to be
signed on electronic trading platform with Liquidity Man-
agement Bank (LMB). This agreement needs to be registered
by a Central Securities Depository and an ISIN number needs
to be generated by Takas Clearing House (Custody and Ex-
change Bank).
The issued 2-StepMurabaha would be similar to Sukuk and
it carries rights and obligations for LMB to disburse requested
amount against international trade shipping documents:
1 Bill of Lading, Invoice, Inspection Reports, etc. for import
financing under L/C, Documentary Collection and Cash
against Good payment methods.
2 Export declaration form for export financing.
LMB would arrange a Murabaha or Mudaraba syndication
again on electronic trading platform connected to agreement
signed between LMB and RMB. In case of Murabaha syndi-
cation, syndication participants would take the risk of LMB
and in case of Mudaraba syndication, these banks would take
the risk of RMB. The key in this transaction is LMB which isge. Source: Gundogdu (2014a, 2014b).
4 In his paper in the name of “Margin Call in Islamic Finance”, Gundogdu
explained different aspect of Risk Management for asset backed Murabaha
transaction and proposed solution against possible risk associated with keeping
ownership of goods financed by financiers. The most of the proposed tech-
niques are also applicable to E-WR financing.
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Multi-Lateral Development Banks for the health of the market.
In practice, LMB would first get request from RMB for 2-Step
Murabaha and then sign agreement with RMB only after
signing the initial Murabaha/Mudaraba agreement with syn-
dication participants to commit for the transaction.
RMB, LMB and syndication banks would hold investment
account with Takas Clearing House. LMB and syndication
banks would also get right for repayment from the Murabaha
sale. Transaction would flow as:
1 The importer or exporter submit their proof of transaction
(shipping documents or custom declaration forms) to
RMB and ask for financing.
2 RMB would request disbursement for this transaction from
LMB.
3 LMB instructs Takas Clearing House to debit the account
so syndication bank and credit the account of LMB for this
transaction. LMB would make payment to supplier.
4 With this transaction, LMB as per Murabaha agreement
purchased from supplier and makes a differed, such as 12
months, sale to RMB.
5 On the date of maturity after such as 12 months, RMB
instruct Takas Clearing House to debit her account and
credit the accounts of LMB and syndication banks.
In case of 2-Step Murabaha, there is no ownership related
risk since ownership simultaneously transferred and debt
created out of differed sale. LMB and syndication bank can set
exposure limit on RMBs and manage their portfolios within
these limits set by their Risk Management Departments.
In both Murabaha and Mudaraba syndication, syndication
participants would have option to sale their portion of theMur-
abaha agreement issued by RMB similar to common stock or
Sukuk sale. This implies that they would transfer obligation to
fulfill for financing request from RMB and rights of receivable.
Although this would create room for liquidity management and
facilitate traditional import/export financing based on Asset
BasedMurabaha, there is a huge need for agricultural financing
and good potential to develop Islamic Future Contract and more
flexible liquidity management tool. Under 2-Step Murabaha
investors would transfer all rights and obligation pertaining,
while they can not sale specific import/export transaction due to
Shari'ah restriction. Since in Asset Based Murabaha sale,
ownership immediately transferred from intermediating banks
to final importer. Specific transaction sale, based on import
shipping documents or export declaration forms, would be
factoring/discounting which is debt trading and not allowed in
Islamic Shari'ah. Regardless of this, 2-Step Murabaha under
stock exchangewould be a good omen for liquiditymanagement
and complementaryAssetBackedproducts, inwhichbanks keep
the ownership of goodsfinanceduntil sale, could shoulder. In this
regards, asset backedMurabaha transaction operations based on
E-Warehouse Receipt (E-WR) for soft commodities in licensed
warehouse has excellent embedded features. Traditionally, asset
backed Murabaha operations used to finance commodities
stored inwarehouses. Thefinancier takes commodityfinanced ascollateral. Gundogdu (2014b) demonstrated cases for sugar
import financing and coffee export financing.4 Unlike asset
based 2-Step Murabaha in which syndication banks and LMB
takes the risk of RMB, in asset backed Murabaha since the
ownership remainswithLMBriskmanagement features arevery
different. LMB exposed to price fluctuation and risk associated
with ownership of commodities financed such as quality, quan-
tity and insurance. Recent laws on LicensedWarehouses, which
require 100 percent physical commodities against E-WR for soft
commodities, give rise to extension of asset backed Murabaha
from regular warehouses and bonded warehouses to licensed
warehouses. Since there is already an electronic platform to trade
E-Warehouse Receipts, adding signing of asset backMurabaha
on the same platform as shown in Fig. 3, would make another
liquidity management tool for banks.
1 Commodities delivered to Licensed Warehouse by farmers
and warehouse operator issues (e-WR) to farmer through
Commodity Exchange;
2 Supplier places (e-WR) with broker / LMB receives a
requesting payment against ownership transfer of (e-WR);
3 Market Maker pays a min security margin of 20% in cash
of the (e-WR) value;
4 Banks pays 100% of the (e-WR) value to the local Sup-
plier through LMB's account with Takas Custody and
Exchange Bank against ownership transfer;
5 Market Maker pays for commodities into LMB's account
in Takas Custody and Exchange Bank through broker;
6 Upon payment, broker transfers the ownership of the sold
amount of commodities to Market Maker;
7 Market Maker takes physical delivery of commodities.
The role of market maker is key in this transaction since
she would sing asset backed Murabaha agreement with LMB.
The agreement stipulates that:
1 LMB would buy E-Warehouse Receipt (generated for/after
deposit of commodities into licensed warehouses).
2 Market Maker would contribute with 20 percent cash
margin
3 LMB pays 100 percent to farmers
4 In case of price drop, LMB can ask for Margin Call and
Market Maker top up the cash margin. Hence, Market
Maker takes the commodity price fluctuation risk.
5 Market Maker accepts the delivery of commodities in 3, 6
and 9 months maturities. For this, on electronic platform
LMB and Market Maker signs 3, 6 and 9 month asset back
Murabaha contract.
Market Makers are expected to be big users of soft com-
modities such as flour mills for wheat. They want to fix their
Fig. 3. Liquidity management based on asset backed Murabaha through physical commodities in licensed warehouses.
Source: The author.
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assure supply of wheat for their annual production plan. They
are obliged to receive physical delivery of commodities at the
maturity. In case of change in production plan, they can
transfer this obligation to other traders on electronic platform.
The ownership would remain with LMB, which can arrange a
Murabaha or Mudaraba syndication in international market.
Since, they hold the ownership, Syndication banks can sell any
amount of E-WR at any time on electronic platform or buy.
Hence, there will be liquid secondary market.
From Maqasid Al-Shari'ah perspective:
1 Islamic FIs would use their excess fund to facilitate/
finance agricultural production hence contribute rural
development. They would have chance to buy and sell E-
WR since there is 100 percent physical commodity and
bono-fide intention of delivery.
2 Farmers would get much better price and available cash
for their effort since number and amount of buyer during
harvest season will increase with inclusion of Islamic FIs
as buyers.
3 Market Maker should be processor of the soft commodity
who is ready to take physical delivery. He can fix his raw
material cost in advance and have predictability for future.
Besides, since the commodities would be stored in
licensed warehouse, she would be availed from storage
hustle. If her production plan changes, she would transfer
physical delivery obligation, in some case with some
losses, to other traders on electronic platform.
LMB would calculate 3, 6, and 9 month asset back Mur-
abaha (Islamic Future Contract) as follows:
Future Price ¼ Spot Price þ Carrying Cost (Mark-up,
Licensed Warehouse Storage Cost, Storage Insurance
Cost) þ Transaction Cost (fees of Security Broker, Takas
Custody and Exchange Bank and Commodity Exchange).For sustainability of the system, there needs to be very strin-
gent risk management monitoring. In Annex-I, Matrix for risk
mitigation is provided. In order to increase interest of syndication
market in the product, the risk rating of the scheme could be
increased by a Takaful in the form of political risk insurance and
contingency clauses for negligence of 3rd parties. The presence
of Takaful would increase risk rating and risk averse funds can
also be attracted. The participants would increase the liquidity in
the market and ultimately would benefit farmers with more po-
tential buyers during harvest and benefit processors with reduced
mark-up in future price calculation due to high demand fromFIs.
As for Islamic FIs, they would place their funds into bon-fide
Shari'ah compliant transaction against strong collateral.
4. Conclusion
Parade from greenfield to capital markets shall not be
smooth, if necessary regulatory arrangements put are not in
place. Both asset based and backed Murabaha sales necessi-
tates purchase of goods financed by Islamic FIs, in many
countries there still does not exist specific law to manage such
features. In case of asset based Murabaha transfer of owner-
ship is simultaneous, hence, regulatory wise more straight
forward. However, asset backed Murabaha (or proposed Is-
lamic Commodity Future Contract) necessitate keeping goods
on balance sheet which is not allowed by banking laws.
Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency, Custody and
Exchanges Bank, Central Security Depository, Stock Exchange
and Regional Commodity Exchanges should streamline their
modus operandi in order to incubate the proposed Islamic
liquidity management tools. For example, Stock Exchange
should provide platform for primary market. Regional Com-
modity Exchange needs to expand it capacity to cater collateral
management services to assure matching of E-WR with phys-
ical stock. As indicated in Fig. 4, asset based and asset backed
Sharia'ah compliant alternatives can make their way to Islamic
capital markets to create liquidity platform for industry to grow
healthy and contribute real economy, if necessary regulatory
Annex-I. Risk matrix for Islamic Commodity Future Contract from the perspective of LMB and Syndication Banks.
Risk areas Risks Likely cause(s) Mitigants/preventive action(s)
Country Political ▪ Instability due to geopolit-
ical changes in the region
▪ Political risk insurance/Takaful
Economic ▪ Economic downturn ▪ Operating within country exposure limit set by Risk Management Department
Legal ▪ Title of goods under law ▪ Locally sourced goods are stored in licensed warehouses under the supervision
of a licensed warehouse operator evidenced by (e-WR) which is issued by the
Commodity Exchange and maintained by the Central Security Depository
Market Maker Credit ▪ Client's default ▪ Portfolio monitoring
▪ Licensed status of warehouses, physical commodity
Commodity Price ▪ Price downturn
▪ Local oversupply
▪ Market Maker's trading experience
▪ Sufficient security margin, with
a top-up clause: Margin Call.
▪ Price verification before accepting to finance any purchase
▪ Close monitoring to commodity prices on a daily basis
▪ Liquidation if required (possible local offtakers)
▪ Any possible liquidation of locally sourced commodity stored in licensed
warehouses would be done through the relevant Commodity Exchange.
Quality ▪ Poor quality ▪ Quality is verified by licensed labs under control of local Commodity
Exchange.
Storage ▪ Poor storage conditions
▪ Storage facility safety &
security
▪ Degrading of goods quality
if stored too long
▪ Licensed Warehouses storage quality is inspected by government bodies on
regular basis.
▪ Monitoring of local Commodity Exchange as collateral manager.
▪ All risk insurance covering marines and Storage including product deterioration
clauses (Takaful )
Industry Market ▪ Not enough demand by
local or international off
takers
▪ Only soft commodities such as wheat with stable demand even in dire situation
will be financed.
▪ Market Maker's experience in reading market trends
3rd Party Securities
Company as
Broker/Facility
Agent
▪ Non-performing orders
correctly and in timely
manner
▪ Only securities companies with good track records will used as broker/facility
agent
Local Commodity
Exchange as
Collateral
Manager
▪ Non-performance, negli-
gence, misconduct or fraud
by collateral manager staff
▪ Collateral manager will be local Commodity Exchange which is a reputable
local entity.
▪ Collateral manger misappropriation is covered by a clause under the cargo
insurance policy
Licensed
Warehouse
Operator
▪ Non-performance, negli-
gence, misconduct or fraud
by operator's staff
▪ All licensed warehouse operators are licensed and inspected periodically by the
Ministry of Agriculture (every two years).
▪ Every licensed warehouse operator provides to the indemnity fund cashable
security that worth 15% of their liabilities in order to cover claims by
depositors.
Insurance/Takaful
Company
▪ Rejecting claims
▪ Failing to indemnify
▪ Reputable local insurance company, with reinsurance from a global brokerage
firm
▪ Comprehensive All Risk Insurance Policy
Fig. 4. From greenfield to capital markets. Source: The author.
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255A.S. Gundogdu / Borsa _Istanbul Review 16-4 (2016) 249e255and electronic platform infrastructure are provided. As an
additional step, Sukuk trading can also be included in the
platform similar to trading of 2-Step Murabaha and Islamic
Commodity Future Contract (Asset Backed Murabaha).
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